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Abstract 
 
Clearly dominating the US retail market, Wal-Mart expanded into Germany (and Eu-
rope) in late 1997. Wal-Mart’s attempt to apply the company’s proven US success for-
mula in an unmodified manner to the German market, however, turned out to be nothing 
short of a fiasco. Upon closer inspection, the circumstances of the company’s failure to 
establish itself in Germany give reason to believe that it pursued a fundamentally 
flawed internationalization strategy due to an incredible degree of ignorance of the 
specific features of the extremely competitive German retail market. Moreover, instead 
of attracting consumers with an innovative approach to retailing, as it has done in the 
USA, in Germany the company does not seem to be able to offer customers any com-
pelling value proposition in comparison with its local competitors. Wal-Mart Germa-
ny’s future looks bleak indeed. 
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                “Wal-Mart Germany: A Problem of Size” (Source: Lebensmittelzeitung) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Even by American standards, Wal-Mart must be considered as a success story without 
precedent (rivaled probably only by Microsoft’s rise). Forty years after its humble be-
ginnings in 1962, when Sam Walton and his brother Bud set up store No. 1, a five-and-
dime outfit, on Walnut Street in tiny Rogers, Arkansas, continuous double-digit growth 
rates have not only transformed it into the world’s largest retailer. Having been the 
biggest private-sector employer in the world for a few years already, with around 1.38 
million staff on its payroll, Wal-Mart recently also overtook General Motors and Exxon 
to become the world’s largest corporation in terms of revenue. After establishing itself 
as the dominant player on its homemarket, Wal-Mart decided, in the late 1980ies, to 
embark upon an ambitious internationalization drive to sustain its brisk corporate 
growth. The stated strategic goal was to have its foreign operations contribute a third of 
Wal-Mart’s total profits by 2005. In 1991, the first store outside the USA, a SAM’s 
Club membership warehouse, was opened in Polenco, a suburb of Mexico City. Today, 
Wal-Mart is active in 9 more countries, and as early as 1993, a separate division – Wal-
Mart International – was created to supervise and manage the company’s international 
operations.  
However, on the international scene Wal-Mart’s proven US success formula – everyday 
low prices due to the extensive use of advanced IT, sophisticated logistics and inventory 
management techniques, a strong emphasis on customer service, and highly-motivated 
personnel (helped by a quasi-religious corporate culture) – so far paid off only in neigh-
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boring Mexico and Canada, where Wal-Mart has become the undisputed market leader. 
It is therefore no exaggeration to state, as a report by London-based investment bank 
WestLB Panmurne did, that ”Wal-Mart has not yet succeeded in markets that it cannot 
drive a truck to.“1 Not only does this verdict include the company‘s activities in Indone-
sia, which were suspended after two years of heavy losses – while Wal-Mart‘s remai-
ning operations in Asia, a few outlets in China, South Korea, and, since 2002, Japan, are 
considered to be profitable (albeit far less so than its North American activities) – and in 
Latin America (Brazil and Argentina). In particular, its foray into the German market, 
the third biggest retail market in the world after the US and Japan and by far also the 
most important one in Europe, has so far turned out to be a ”fiasco“ (according to 
Commerzbank Securities‘ European retail research analyst Jürgen Elfers2). As we will 
argue in this paper, it even offers a textbook case how not to enter a foreign market.  
Our analysis is organized as follows: After a brief company profile of both Wal-Mart, 
Inc. and Wal-Mart Germany, and an excursus on the dimensions of competition in 
retailing we will discuss the sector-specific approaches and impediments to internatio-
nalization in the retailing industry. After that we provide a survey of the German retail 
market including an overview of the relevant institutional and legal framework. Finally, 
we will perform a critical assessment of Wal-Mart‘s entry and business strategy in 
Germany. 
 
Wal-Mart: A Company Profile 
 
Wal-Mart, Inc. 
 
Wal-Mart has revolutionized retailing in the USA.3 As the company’s spectacular reve-
nue growth since 1962 illustrates, it has spread like the proverbial bushfire across the 
country, in particular in formerly un(der)served Rural America. In 1979, its annual turn-
over reached $1 billion for the first time. In 1993, it achieved this feat for the first time 
in a mere week, and, in November 2001, even in a single day.4 In the year ending 
January 31st, 2003, Wal-Mart, Inc. reported sales of $244.5 billion (around 16.5 per cent 
of which were earned abroad) – up 12.3 per cent versus 2002, and a whopping 107 per 
cent increase since 1998. This translated into earnings (before extraordinary items) of 
$8.04 billion, or 3.3 per cent of sales and a 22.9 per cent return on equity.5 With sales of 
$25 billion and $57 billion respectively Wal-Mart has grown to become the dominant 
                                                 
1  As quoted by Grose (2001, p. 49). 
2  As quoted by Ernsberger Jr. (2002, p. 51). 
3  For a detailed account see Slater (2003). 
4  See Wefing (2003). 
5  See CorporateInformation.com (2003). This return contrasts markedly with a paltry ROI of just 
6 per cent for its international operations (Grose 2001, p. 49). – Notice to readers: As Wal-Mart 
refuses to publish the profits or losses of its international subsidiaries, and does not report them 
to the SEC either, all such figures quoted in the text are estimates by analysts and other retail ex-
perts. The same is also true for some major players on the German market, notably the Aldi 
Group and the Schwarz Group. 
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clothing/textile and food retailer on the US market.6 Every week, around 100 million 
shoppers frequent its stores: 1.647 Discount Stores (non-food general merchandise 
items only), 1.066 Supercenters (general merchandise plus full-line food departments), 
500 SAM’s Clubs (membership warehouse stores) and 31 Neighborhood Stores (small 
convenience stores) in the US alone, plus more than 1.100 outfits abroad – most of them 
in the Supercenter and SAM’s Club formats. In the past few years, Wal-Mart has begun 
a large-scale conversion program with the long-term aim to transform most of its Dis-
count Stores into Supercenters. The Supercenter format being roughly comparable to 
the hypermarket store which was invented by Carrefour, a French retailer, in the 
1960ies, it also became Wal-Mart’s format of choice in Germany.  
Further corporate superlatives include the following:  
• Wal-Mart‘s Retail Link-system, the backbone of its sophisticated inventory 
management and logistics infrastructure, is the biggest civilian database in the 
world (second only to the Pentagon’s, but holding three times more data than the 
US Internal Revenue Service’s mainframes). 
• It is operating the world’s biggest private satellite communications system, 
allowing it, amongst other things, to track sales, to replenish inventories and to 
process payments in real-time, and even to regulate the temperature in individual 
stores. 
• Wal-Mart’s 2003 turnover is three times higher than Carrefour’s, the world’s 
no. 2 retailer (Table 1), and equivalent to the combined revenues of Germany‘s 
Top 30 retailers.7 
 
                                                 
6  See Heuer (2002). 
7  See Brück (2002). 
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Table 1: The World’s Top Retailers (2001) 
Rank Company Country Revenues 
($ billion) 
1 Wal-Mart Inc. USA 217,8 
2 Carrefour France 62.2 
3 Royal Ahold Netherlands 59.6 
4 The Kroger Co. USA 50.0 
5 Metro Germany 44.3 
6 Albertson’s Inc. USA 38.2 
7 Kmart Corp. USA 34.6 
8 Safeway Inc. USA 34.3 
9 Costco Wholesale Corp. USA 34.1 
10 Tesco United Kingdom 34.1 
11 Rewe Group Germany 33.6 
12 Aldi Group Germany 29.0* 
… 
16 
 
Edeka/AVA Group 
 
Germany 
 
25.1 
… 
18 
 
Tengelmann Group 
 
Germany 
 
23.1 
... 
25 
 
Schwarz Group 
 
Germany 
 
16.7* 
Source: Lebensmittelzeitung (Internet edition) (2002a)        (* = Estimates) 
 
 
A true giant on the huge US domestic market, Wal-Mart, however, still is only a minor 
player in international retailing – both in terms of foreign sales as a percentage of total 
revenues and of the number of countries served (Table 2 and Table 3). A substantial de-
gree of geographical coverage has only been achieved in North America, i.e. on the 
adjacent markets of Mexico (date of entry: 1991; 563 stores), Puerto Rico (1992; 17), 
and Canada (1994; 196). This contrasts markedly with its minuscule operations both in 
Latin America – 11 stores in Argentina plus 22 in Brazil (both entered in 1995) – and 
Asia, with 19 stores in China (1996), 11 in South Korea (1998), as well as a 6 per cent 
share in Seiyu, a Japanese retailer, since 2002. In Europe, Wal-Mart has so far only ex-
panded into Germany (1998; 93 stores) – which was then heralded as its bridgehead into 
Europe – and the United Kingdom (1999; 252).8 
 
                                                 
8  See Ernsberger Jr. (2002: 50).   
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Table 2: Top 10 Int’l Retailers: Foreign Sales (2000) 
Rank Company Country Foreign Sales 
(in % of Total Sales) 
1 Delhaize Lion Group Belgium 83.5 
2 Royal Ahold Netherlands 80.8 
3 IGA Inc. USA 62.4 
4 Otto Versand Germany 55.0 
5 Tengelmann Group Germany 48.5 
6 Carrefour France 47.5 
7 PPR France 47.5 
8 Metro Germany 42.1 
9 Kingfisher Plc United Kingdom 40.0 
10 Aldi Group Germany 37.0 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001, p.2) 
 
 
Table 3: Top 10 Int’l Retailers: Foreign Countries Served (2000) 
Rank Company Country Number of Foreign 
Countries Served 
 
1 IGA Inc. USA 41 
2 Marks & Spencer UK 37 
3 PPR France 28 
4 Toys-R-Us USA 28 
5 Carrefour France 27 
6 Royal Ahold Netherlands 24 
7 Otto Versand Germany 23 
8 Metro Germany 22 
9 Ito-Yokado Japan 20 
10 Office Depot USA 19 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001, p.2) 
 
 
 
Wal-Mart is serving Argentina, Canada, Germany, South Korea, Puerto Rico and the 
UK through wholly-owned and Brazil and Mexico through majority-owned subsidi-
aries. It has preferred, however, to forge joint ventures to enter the Chinese market, and 
a small minority shareholding in an established local retailer in Japan.9,10 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  See Wal-Mart (2002 and 2003). 
10  Apart from Japan, Canada, South Korea, the UK and Germany were all entered through ac-
quisitions.  
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Wal-Mart Germany 
 
Wal-Mart decided to build its initial presence in Germany through acquisitions. In 
December 1997, it took over the renowned 21-store Wertkauf chain (revenues:  €1.2 
billion) for an estimated $1.04 billion, followed one year later by the acquisition of In-
terspar’s 74 hypermarkets (revenues: €850 million) from Spar Handels AG, the German 
unit of the French Intermarché Group, for €560 million.11,12 In the wake of these 
transactions, Wal-Mart immediately became the country’s fourth biggest operator of 
hypermarkets. However, with a current turnover of around €2.9 billion, and a stagnating 
market share of just 1.1 per cent, the US giant still is a quantité négligeable on the Ger-
man retail market (Table 4). Even worse, with estimated accumulated losses of more 
than € 1 billion,13 it is literally drowning in red ink – although, according to Wal-Mart 
Germany’s current CEO, Kay Hafner, its non-food assortment, which accounts for 
around 50 per cent of its revenues, is profitable.14 Rumor has it that Wal-Mart Germany 
is making money at only two (!) of its locations.15 And instead of expanding its network 
of stores by 50 units by early 2001, as originally planned, the company has been forced 
to close two big outlets, while at the same time it was only able to fully remodel three 
locations into its flagship Supercenter format.16 Due to its problems the company re-
cently also had to lay off around 1.000 staff;17 further cuts are very likely.  
 
                                                 
11  See O’Brian (2002); Brück (2002). 
12  Throughout this paper we have assumed, for reasons of simplicity, a $/€-exchange rate at parity 
(i.e. 1$ = 1€). 
13  US-based investment bank Salomon Smith Barley estimated a loss of $350 million for FY 2000 
alone (Wirtschaftswoche 2001a). 
14  See Kranich/Rutsche (2002). 
15  See Ronke/de Paoli (2003). 
16  Nevertheless, the biggest one of these, in Pattensen near Hannover, is still operating at a level of 
60 per cent of planned revenues only (Brück 2002). 
17  See Wal-Mart Germany (2002 and 2003). 
  
 
 
10
Table 4: Germany’s Top 15 Retailers (2002) 
Rank Company Food Sales 
(in % of Total Sales) 
Revenues in 
Germany 
(€ billion) 
1 Metro AG 
 Real 
 Metro Cash+Carry 
 Kaufhof 
 Extra 
 Others 
45.1 
75.0 
75.0 
7.1 
86.0 
2.2 
32.0 
8.6 
6.6 
4.4 
2.9 
9.5 
2 Rewe Group 
   Rewe AG 
   Rewe Wholesale 
68.6 
66.7 
95.0 
28.6 
26.6 
2.0 
3 Edeka/AVA Group 83.1 25.2 
4 Aldi Group 81.0 25.0* 
5 Schwarz Gruppe 
Kaufland 
Lidl 
80.4 
77.0 
84.0 
17.2* 
8.7 
8.5 
6 KarstadtQuelle 
    Stationary distribution 
    Mail-order 
5.8 
11.0 
0.0 
16.1* 
8.5 
7.6 
7 Tengelmann Group 
    Plus 
    Kaiser’s 
    kd Kaiser’s Drugstore 
   Others 
62.3 
88.0 
93.3 
81.5 
0.0 
12.5* 
5.6 
2.6 
0.5 
3.8 
8 Lekkerland-Tobaccoland 85.0 8.2 
9 Spar Group 92.3 7.5 
10 Schlecker 95.0 5.3* 
11 Globus 55.0 3.4 
12 Dohle Group 
    Hit 
    Handelshof Cologne 
    Bruelle & Schmeltzer 
   Others 
83.5 
88.9 
85.0 
59.5 
82.5 
2.9 
1.1 
0.5 
0.2 
1.1 
13 Wal-Mart Germany 50.0 2.9* 
14 Norma 87.0 2.4* 
15 Bartels-Langness 81.7 2.1* 
Source: Lebensmittelzeitung (Internet edition) (2003)              (* = Estimates) 
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Excursus: Dimensions of Retail Competition 
 
Retailers act as intermediaries between the manufacturers of goods, and some services, 
and end-consumers.18 Typically, the latter can be described as small, immobile and 
uninformed with the attribute 
• small referring to the fact that each of their purchases usually amounts to only a 
minor share of their total household expenditure and to their chosen retailers’ re-
venues (in other words, in a hypothetical world without retailers end-consumers 
could not exert any bargaining power with respect to manufacturers or as 
effectively monitor product quality), 
• immobile referring to their inability or, due to high translocation costs, unwil-
lingness to travel far for their routine (small) purchases, and 
• uniformed referring to their lack of detailed information about the availability, 
quality and prices – including special offers – of specific items and about the 
size and coverage of the assortments of all (local) retailers. 
 
Aside from explaining the existence of retailers, these characteristics also have funda-
mental repercussions on the way they compete with each other. Accordingly, a retailer’s 
competitive advantage may result from 
• lower prices (including a reputation for proven or at least credible pertinent 
value propositions such as Wal-Mart’s famous “everyday low prices”, or “we 
sell for less – always”-pledges), 
• a more favorable, i.e. near or easily accessible, location (which may, in turn, 
even allow its incumbent to charge customers higher prices in return for this 
additional convenience), 
• better product selection and category management (i.e. a product range that 
meets the consumers’ specific needs better than its rivals’ do), and/or 
• superior customer service (real or perceived). 
 
However, legal barriers and some forms of behavioral regulation may effectively shield 
incumbents from innovative, more efficient and/or more service-oriented newcomers. In 
particular, these include but are not limited to 
• stringent planning regimes and zoning regulations which may delay or even 
hinder both new entry through greenfield investments and the expansion or re-
modelling of existing stores, 
• restrictive shopping hour regulations, 
• antitrust and (un)fair trading regulations that may restrict price competition or 
prohibit some forms of advertising or sales promotion. 
 
                                                 
18  See Office of Fair Trading (1997). 
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Internationalization in Retailing 
 
Status quo 
 
Compared with most other industries, retailers were late in jumping on the internatio-
nalization bandwagon. Given the relatively small size of their respective homemarkets, 
it is not overly surprising that the frontrunners were European companies. Carrefour 
(France) and Aldi (Germany) began to venture abroad with their specific formats – hy-
permarkets in the case of the former, hard discounting (see below) in the case of the 
latter – more than three decades ago. It was not until the 1980ies, with a significant ac-
celeration during the 1990ies, that the internationalization of retailers began to gain mo-
mentum. Still, in our view just a handful of those players with international operations 
deserve the label “international retailer” in the sense that they realize a significant share 
of their sales outside their country of origin and that they have successfully established 
a long-term presence in a large number of culturally diverse and/or geographically di-
stant countries. Again, most of these companies are based in Western Europe rather than 
in the US or North America. 
 
Prevailing Strategies 
 
All retail is local. Hence, the mail-order/e-commerce segment maybe aside, retailing is 
special in the sense that exports are not a viable option in order to expand one’s busi-
ness across national borders. Consequently, other internationalization strategies have to 
be pursued, i.e. either 
• organic growth, 
• joint ventures, 
• strategic alliances, 
• franchising, 
• minority or majority shareholdings in established local retailers, or 
• mergers and acquisitions. 
 
A large and still growing body of theoretical and empirical literature has evolved to 
highlight the respective merits, disadvantages and specific risks of either approach.19 In 
retailing, however, with increasingly stringent zoning regulations substantially limiting 
the scope for expansion, at least for operators of the larger formats, relatively low-risk 
strategies such as organic (internal) growth, have become almost impossible to imple-
ment in the extremely dense populated countries of Europe (or East Asia). Its extraordi-
nary failure rate notwithstanding, most retailers have therefore chosen to resort to the 
riskiest strategy to enter foreign markets: mergers and acquisitions.20,21  
                                                 
19  See Kutschker/Schmid (2001). 
20  See Zentes/Swoboda (1998); Arthur Andersen (2001). 
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Impediments to Retail Internationalization 
 
By and large, the internationalization efforts of most retailers do not deserve to be called 
unqualified success stories; many have even failed in and have therefore had to with-
draw from at least some countries. While the underlying causes are a indeed a “mixed 
bag” – aside from the general barriers to entry in retailing which we will discuss in the 
next section, aggressive (price and foreclosure) reactions by the incumbent oligopolies 
were always a major contributing factor –, valuable lessons can be learned from the suc-
cessful few, i.e. the likes of Carrefour, Tesco,22 Aldi, Metro, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), 
and Ikea:23  
• All of them discovered, stuck to and exploited a specific market niche neglected 
or overlooked by their local competitors. They were thus in the favorable positi-
on to offer their customers a very distinctive value proposition which their local 
competitors found very difficult to emulate.  
• Most of them relied upon organic growth or joint ventures or other forms of co-
operation with locals. Some others preferred to enter new foreign markets by 
acquisition. However, all retailers which were successful in doing so, took over 
a leading local incumbent in order to build (large) scale fast. 
• However, their individual entry strategies notwithstanding, all of them were 
willing to and adept in fine-tuning their proven business formulas, operations 
and product ranges to reflect and cater to the different tastes and preferences of a 
critical mass of local consumers. 
• They primarily harnessed the superior market knowledge of local managers and 
kept investing in local talent to bridge the unavoidable intercultural gaps. 
• To minimize their exposure to political risk, they did not become engaged in po-
litically unstable geographic regions and countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
21  Depending on definition and statistic between 50 and 80 per cent of all mergers have failed to 
deliver the desired results (Ravnescraft/Scherer 1989; Hviid/Prendergast 1993; Ernst/Halevy 
2000). 
22  Of course, there are exceptions to every rule, including this one: Even very experienced inter-
national retailers like Carrefour and Tesco failed (miserably) in Germany. 
23  For details see Incandela/McLaughlin/Smith Shi (1999), Child/Heywood/Kliger (2002) and Child 
(2002). 
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The German Retail Market 
 
Some General Background Information 
 
Germany accounts for around 15 per cent of Europe’s $2 trillion-a-year retail market.24  
At a GNP of €2 trillion and populated by around 80 million affluent consumers, it is by 
far the biggest national retail market in the old world. As in most other Western Europe-
an countries, the birthrate, however, has been slightly negative since the mid-1960ies. 
Currently, the German (and, albeit to a lesser degree, the European) retail market is in a 
state of deep crisis. From the 1950ies until the early 1990ies – when the post-reunificati-
on boom drew to a close – retail sales in Germany had traditionally grown slightly faster 
than GNP. Since then, they have stagnated before plummeting since 2001.25 2002 is 
widely considered to have been the worst year ever for German retailers,26 with 2003 
looking even worse.27 On average, consumers spend 30 per cent of their available in-
come with retailers, down from 40 per cent only ten years ago,28 because households 
shift an ever increasing share of their expenditure into areas such as housing, tourism, 
and communications.29,30 As a result, the number of employees declined from 2.75 mil-
lion to 2.5 million between 1996 and 2001, 50 per cent of whom work on a part-time 
basis.31 Finally, the German retail sector primarily relies upon skilled and semi-skilled 
labor, around one fourth of whom are unionized. 
 
Oligopolistic Market Structure – The Key Players  
 
Concentration of the German retail market is gradually increasing with the Top 10 now 
representing around 84 per cent of sales. The Top 5 alone – Metro (19.7 per cent), Rewe 
(13.6 per cent), Edeka/AVA (12.7 per cent), Aldi (10.1 per cent) and Tengelmann (7.6 
per cent) – are accounting for a market share of 63 per cent.32,33 Food (and drug) retail-
                                                 
24  See O’Brian (2002). 
25  See Lambertz (2002). 
26  See Städtler (2002). 
27  See Wenzel (2002a). 
28  See Greipl/Täger (2001: 27). 
29  See Täger (2000: 9). 
30  This trend has prompted some retailers, notably Rewe, to follow changing consumption patterns 
by diversifying into tourism. Today, the group owns one of Germany’s leading package-tour 
operators. 
31  See ver.di (2002: 3). 
32  See Monopolkommission (1994); KPMG/EHI (2001: 18ff.); A.C. Nielsen (2002). 
33  In France the Top 5 (Carrefour/Promedès, Leclerc, Casino, Intermarché, Auchan) control 88 per 
cent of the market, compared with 70.4 per cent in the UK (Tesco, Sainsbury, Wal-Mart/ASDA, 
Safeway and Somerfield). On the smaller Dutch market (15 million inhabitants) the Top 2 Ahold 
and Laurus achieve 63 per cent (KPMG/EHI 2001, p. 21). For other countries see The Economist 
(2001). 
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ing, however, is dominated by a Germany-specific format that was pioneered by Aldi in 
1962 (see box below) and later successfully imitated by the likes of Lidl (part of the 
Schwarz Group), Norma and Penny (part of the Rewe Group): hard discounters, typi-
cally offering a range of 600 to 700 products, with a high share of own-brands, at rock-
bottom price and ultra-low margins. At the moment these “pile-‘em-high, sell-‘em-
cheap”-merchants, control around a third of the food market – as opposed to only 10 per 
cent in the UK and 8 per cent in France –, with a share of 40 per cent forecast for 
2007.34  
Increasingly, however, the hard discounters are competing fiercely with the traditional 
retailers in the non-food segment, too. Aldi, for example, which has been selling high-
quality own-brand computers at very attractive prices around twice a year for around 
half a decade, has become Germany’s biggest PC-retailer with a market share of 21.5 
per cent ahead of Fujitsu Siemens (16,9 per cent),35 and is also one of the country’s ma-
jor distributors of clothing; in fact, in almost all product categories it has on offer, Aldi 
ranks amongst the country’s Top 3 to Top 5 sellers by sales volume. 
 
 
Box: The Aldi Group 
In 1946, Theo and Karl Albrecht took over their parents’ convenience store in Essen. Until 
1960, they had managed to increase the number of Albrecht Discount stores – by then colloqui-
ally known as Aldi – to roughly 300. In 1961, the brothers invented the hard discount format 
combining ultra-low prices (and hence margins) with high product quality, a very narrow as-
sortment of around 600 to 700 products, and a no-frills shopping environment, all of which have 
translated into the industry’s highest labor and area productivity. Aldi is debt-free and pays 
above-average wages. In 1962, the brothers split the company into two independent operations: 
Aldi Nord (Aldi North), headed by Theo Albrecht, and Karl Albrecht’s Aldi Süd (Aldi South). 
Although being generally referred to as the Aldi Group ever since, they by and large operate 
independently, with coordination taking place only with respect to some major decisions such as 
supplier choice and important pricing decisions. The reason behind the split – which also resul-
ted in a demarcation line being drawn across Germany, clearly separating the two Aldis’ eco-
nomic interest spheres ever since, and international markets later on – was Karl Albrecht’s 
refusal to sell cigarettes, not on health grounds but with the aim to discourage theft. Today the 
Aldi Group, aside from some ancillary activities (real estate, coffee roastery etc.), operates 3.741 
stores in Germany and 2.643 abroad. Aldi Nord is present in France (516 outlets), the Nether-
lands (384), Belgium (359), Denmark (200), Spain (18) and Luxemburg (10), while Aldi Süd 
has actitivities in the USA (578), Austria (267), the UK (with 230 stores in England, 20 in 
Wales and 17 in Scotland), Australia (34) and Ireland (10).36  
 
 
 
                                                 
34  See The Economist Online Edition (2000); M+M Planet Retail (2002). 
35  See Süddeutsche Zeitung Online Edition (2003). 
36  See Schlitt (2001); Lebensmittelzeitung (Internet Edition) (2002c); Stern Online Edition (2002); 
Brandes (2003). 
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Ultra-Low Profitability 
 
With average profits reaching only 0.8 per cent of sales in West Germany – down from 
3.4 per cent in 1970 – and 0.5 per cent in the poorer Eastern part of the country,37 
Germany’s retail industry is probably the least profitable all over the industrialized 
world. These figures are well below Germany’s manufacturing sector’s average of 3 per 
cent (USA: 8 per cent).38 Returns are particularly meager in the food segment – at 0.5 
per cent of earnings,39,40 compared to 5 per cent in the UK and 3.5 per cent in France41,42 
– and in the super-, hypermarket and DIY-formats. By contrast, they are quite healthy – 
by German standards at least – in the hard discount business, with Aldi again leading the 
pack. With earnings estimated at around 2 per cent of sales, the group is not only Ger-
many’s most successful and most consistently profitable retailer. It even managed to 
double its return to almost 4 per cent in the crisis years 2001 and 2002.43  
However, the hard discounter’s strong and entrenched position and their enormous in-
fluence on prices is only one, although important, explanation for the extremely low 
profit margins in Germany’s retail sector:  
• The vast majority of German retailers are not listed,44 but family-owned – by 
some of the richest families in the country or even the world,45 to be sure – or or-
ganized as co-operatives. Not only does this imply relatively higher barriers to 
exit compared to countries where public-stock companies are dominant (UK, 
USA, France). It also means that the maximization of shareholder value may not 
be their single most important principle of doing business. 
• Although zoning regulations do impose severe restrictions on the construction of 
large-scale stores (>2.500 sp. meters, i.e. ≈27.500 sq. ft.) and greenfield shop-
ping centres,46 they are noticeably less stringent, especially for the smaller units 
(<700 sq. meters or ≈ 7.700 sq. ft.) required by the hard discounters, than 
France’s or the UK’s building codes. As a result, retail space has grown by the 
factor 10 in the past fifty years, with another 10 per cent increase imminent until 
                                                 
37  See Greipl/Täger (2001: 32). 
38  See Jacobsen (2001: 50). 
39  See Spiegel Online (2002). 
40  Since 1991, food prices have risen at a pace below the inflation rate (The Economist 2002). 
41  See Manager Magazin (1999a: 74). 
42  In other words: On a yearly basis, German consumers have to spend around €6.5 billion less on 
food than British consumers as a result (Manager Magazin 1999, p. 74). 
43  See Wolfskeil (2002). 
44  In Germany, only 12 per cent of all food retailers are listed, versus 40 per cent in France and 97 
per cent in the UK (Rehm/Syre 2003, p. 20). 
45  Theo and Karl Albrecht, the brother founders and owners of the Aldi group this year rank third – 
behind Bill Gates and Warren Buffet – in Forbes magazine’s annual list of the world’s richest 
people. 
46  Approximately only 300 shopping centers are in operation throughout Germany. 
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2007.47 Currently, Germany’s selling space amounts to 293 sq. meters per 1.000 
inhabitants, compared with France’s 160 and the UK’s paltry 133.48 
• The EURO-conversion on January 1st, 2002, and the ensuing confusion amongst 
consumers, was (mis)used by some retailers to raise prices dramatically – in-
creases by 10 or 20 per cents were not exceptional –, with equally dramatic con-
sequences not only for their turnover and profits, but also for the sector as a 
whole. Aldi, however, exploiting its reputation for great value (high quality pro-
ducts at very low prices), reacted with the biggest overall price reduction of its 
corporate history. As a result, it was able to increase its sales by more than 10 
per cent in 2001 and, as mentioned above, and to double its profits. 
• Finally, German consumers apparently hold price and value in much higher es-
teem than service and quality. According to a recent survey conducted by Mc-
Kinsey, a consultancy, the share of so-called price/value customers is 42 per cent 
(France: 48 per cent, UK: 32 per cent), whereas only 13 per cent (France: 48; 
UK: 13) consider themselves of the service/quality variety. Affinity consumers, 
i.e. brand-conscious and peer group-oriented customers, account for 45 per cent 
(France: 25; UK: 55).49 The very high elasticity of demand demonstrated by 
German consumers has also been confirmed by a number of other studies.50 
 
Retail-Specific Legislation 
 
As mentioned above, planning laws and zoning regulations hinder large-scale new entry 
by any big-box operator. Some other sector-specific regulations, however, also impact 
significantly upon corporate strategies, and hence retail competition: 
• At a legal maximum of 80 hours/week store opening hours51 in Germany are 
among the shortest in Europe (Table 5). Sunday and holiday openings are not 
permitted at all. This contrasts markedly with the 168 hours/week in the UK, 96 
hours/week in the Netherlands, and a minimum of 144 hours/week in France.52 
• Germany’s fair trading and antitrust laws contain some important restrictions for 
retailers’ pricing policies. To summarize briefly – ignoring the (few) exceptions 
to this rule –, they forbid merchants to sell goods below cost on a permanent 
basis.53 A pricing strategy centered around some loss-leaders is therefore very 
                                                 
47  See Städtler (2000); Greipl/Täger (2001: 34f.). 
48  See The Economist (2002). 
49  See Child/Heywood/Kliger (2002). 
50  E.g. by Herrmann/Möser/Werner (2002). 
51  More generous store hours apply for supermarkets and other retail outlets which are located on 
the premises of airports and major railway stations – and gas stations, many of which have been 
transformed in 24/7 convenience stores as a result. In addition, the German government has 
recently passed legislation extending store opening hours on Saturdays which will take effect on 
June 1st, 2003. Stores will then be allowed to close at 8 p.m. instead of 4 p.m. 
52  See KPMG/EHI (2001: 10). 
53  For details see Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (2002). 
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likely illegal under German law (but more often than not perfectly legal in the 
US and the UK). 
 
Table 5: Store Opening Hours in Select EU Countries 
Country 
 
Mon - Fri Sat Sun/Holidays Hours/Week 
UK 00.00 – 24.00 00.00 – 24.00 00.00 – 24.00 168 
Netherlands 06.00 – 22.00 06.00 – 22.00 Closed 96 
Spain 00.00 – 24.00 00.00 – 2400 Closed 144 
France 00.00 – 24.00 00.00 – 24.00 Open* 
 
144 
(Minimum) 
Germany 06.00 – 20.00 06.00 – 16.00 
[From June 1st, 2003: 
06.00 – 20.00] 
Closed 80 
[From June 1st, 2003: 
84] 
(* Note: Only store-owners and their family-members, but no employees are permitted to work 
 on Sundays and holidays) 
Source: KPMG/EHI (2001, p.10) 
 
 
Wal-Mart’s Strategy in Germany – and Why It Failed 
 
Lee Scott, Wal-Mart Inc.’s current CEO recently admitted in the German business 
weekly Wirtschaftswoche (2001) that the company had messed more things up in Ger-
many than it had managed to do right. Indeed, an endless string of amazing man-
agement blunders have plagued Wal-Mart’s German operation from the very start. Even 
worse, we hold that the company has so far not succeeded to fully remedy any of them. 
Wal-Mart’s principal mistakes on the German market may be summarized as follows: 
• A fundamentally flawed entry-by-acquisition strategy, 
• a management by “hubris and clash of cultures”-approach to labor relations, 
• a blatant failure to deliver on its legendary “we sell for less – always“, “every-
day low prices” and “excellent service” value proposition, and 
• bad publicity due to its repeated infringement of some important German laws 
and regulations. 
 
Flawed entry-by-acquisition strategy 
 
As mentioned above, Wal-Mart entered the German market through two consecutive 
acquisitions. While its first move – the 1997 takeover of the 21 Wertkauf stores – was 
indeed a shrewd one, given that company’s excellent earnings (3 per cent of sales), its 
competitive locations, and its very capable management, Wal-Mart’s 1998 follow-up 
deal with Spar for 74 hypermarkets was widely judged an ill-informed, ill-advised act, 
for several reasons: 
  
 
 
19
• Spar is considered to be the weakest player on the German market due to its 
mostly run-down stores, very heterogeneous in size and format, with the 
majority of them located in less well-off inner-city residential areas. Not only 
did this result – for Spar before and Wal-Mart after the acquisition – in one of 
the industries’ lowest turnover per sq. meter of floor area (Table 6), higher lo-
gistics costs and lower returns. Even worse, Wal-Mart has been unable until 
today to upgrade most of these stores and to implement a uniform design to 
build brand recognition. 
• Nevertheless Wal-Mart was willing to pay Spar €560 million for the transaction 
– which was maybe the best deal throughout Spar’s troubled history as, two 
years earlier, Spar had acquired 36 of these stores for as little as €85 million.54  
Worst of it all, through the extremely costly transaction Wal-Mart did not even 
purchase real estate but has only bought itself subtenant status at most of these 
locations. It is very likely then that the company will be forced to give up a 
number of them as soon as the leases will expire. 
• Ever since, Wal-Mart has been in fruitless talks with competitors Metro and 
Globus in order to expand its far-flung store network substantially (around 80 
per cent of the German population have no Wal-Mart store in their vicinity).55 
With organic growth close to being a mission impossible for hypermarket opera-
tors due to stringent planning and zoning regulations, the company, as a result, 
still lacks the size necessary to extract significant price concessions from suppli-
ers and to reduce its currently very high logistics costs. According to German re-
tail experts, for a company to fully exploit economies of scale in food retailing a 
minimum annual turnover of around €7.7 billion is de rigeur – a critical mass 
which is 2.5 times higher than Wal-Mart Germany’s actual sales.56 
 
                                                 
54  See O’Brian (2000). 
55  Metro’s owers even sacked the company’s year-long CEO, Erich Conradi, who was rumored to 
have prepared a deal, to signal their unwillingness to sell out to Wal-Mart. Nevertheless Metro’s 
Real and Extra divisions would nicely fit in with Wal-Mart’s Supercenter format, while Metro’s 
Cash+Carry outfits would perfectly complement Wal-Mart’s Sam’s Club membership ware-
houses. However, Metro reacted to Wal-Mart’s entry not only by streamlining its (then) loss-
making Extra and Real subsidiaries. In addition, it acquired German rivals Allkauf and Krieg-
baum, thereby significantly limiting Wal-Mart’s scope for future expansion in attractive locati-
ons. 
56  See Bergmann (2000). 
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Table 6: Productivity Per Unit of Sales Floor  
Rank Company Sales in € / sq. meter 
1 Aldi Group 7.500 
2 Rewe Group 5.850 
3 Globus 5.250 
4 Schwarz Group 4.900 
5 Metro 4.000 
6 Edeka Group 3.600 
7 Tengelmann Group 3.600 
8 Wal-Mart 3.500 
9 Spar Group 3.000 
Source: KPMG/EHI (2001, p.15) 
 
 
Management by “hubris and clash of cultures” 
 
Many companies’ ambitions to position themselves (profitably) in foreign markets or to 
establish themselves as “global players” have been thwarted by their inability to fully 
understand and to adapt to the specific conditions of doing business in other countries, 
exposing their profound lack of intercultural competence and management skills. This 
observation is even more true if foreign markets had been entered through mergers or 
acquisitions. The difficulties of making mergers work are well-known to corporate 
leaders, the affected staff, management theorists and management consultancies.57 The 
formidable challenge of post-merger integration is further complicated significantly if it 
must be taken up in an international environment, with all issues frequently being com-
pounded by a lack of language and culture bridging skills. Failure to accomplish this 
task satisfactorily, however, inevitably results in mutual distrust, disillusionment, demo-
tivation and the exodus of high potentials as well as of “old hand” staff – with the well-
documented negative impact on the merged companies' competitiveness, profits and 
shareholder value.  
This is exactly what happened to Wal-Mart Germany. To begin with, it appointed four 
CEOs during its first four years of operation. The first was Rob Tiarks, a US citizen and 
a Wal-Mart, Inc. senior vice president who had previously supervised around 200 US 
Supercenters from the company headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas. Not only did he 
not speak any German. Due to his unwillingness to learn the language – a view shared 
by most of the other US managers that were redeployed to Germany to assist him –, 
English was soon decreed as the official company language at the management level.  
What is more, he displayed an astounding degree of ignorance with regard to the mani-
fold complexities and the legal and institutional framework of the German retail market 
(see below), ignoring any strategic advice presented to him by former Wertkauf execu-
tives – thereby encouraging the top three of them to leave within six months.58 After 
Wal-Mart’s 1998 acquisition of UK retailer ASDA, Tiarks was replaced by Englishman 
                                                 
57  See Hofstede/Neuijen/Ohavy/Sanders (1990); Kay/Shelton (2000); Bekier/Bogardus/Oldham 
(2001). 
58  See O’Brian (2000); Baumann/Gorgs (2001). 
  
 
 
21
Allan Leighton. In terms of his specific market knowledge as well as linguistically as 
inexperienced as Tiarks, he preferred to head the company from his Leeds, UK, office 
and was replaced as little as six month later by Volker Barth.59 The first German ever to 
be entrusted with the top job, and one of the few remaining ex-Wertkauf managers still 
aboard, he too failed to integrate Spar – a rather loose organization of largely indepen-
dent regional units – into Wertkauf – formerly a highly centralized owner-controlled 
firm – and to blend their vastly different corporate cultures with Wal-Mart’s.  
Since May 1st, 2001, Kay Hafner, supported by a group of native Germans, has been at 
the company’s helm. However, the jury is still out as to whether he is indeed the badly 
needed integrator.60 According to headhunters Wal-Mart Germany’s is widely consider-
ed to be a very unattractive employer, with around one third of its executives – from 
store managers upwards – actively seeking job offers from other companies. The under-
lying causes are said to include widespread dissatisfaction with their relatively low pay, 
Wal-Mart’s practice to transfer store managers after one or two years, and the (alleged-
ly) “low American quality standards” of most merchandise currently in store.61 Others 
complained about the company’s frugal internal regulations for business trips, in parti-
cular the decree that executives have to share rooms – a rule unheard of in any other 
major German or European company (and, in our view, unenforceable were it ever im-
posed). 
In the US, Wal-Mart is a strictly non-union employer; only 12 of its more than one mil-
lion US employees – workers in the meat department of its Jacksonville, Texas, store – 
are known to be union members.62 In Germany, like in most other parts of Continental 
Europe however, unions, despite decreasing membership, still wield enormous influ-
ence – both in the political sphere and on the shop floor. The unions’ enthusiasm, 
prompted by Wal-Mart’s decision to hire more staff immediately after its entry in 
Germany to provide “excellent customer service”, quickly faded away. Soon faced with 
rapidly mounting losses, Wal-Mart’s management resorted to staff cuts and closures to 
reduce its above-average personnel costs. Due to strict worker protection regulations, 
however, making surplus workers redundant can be a complicated, lengthy and costly 
affair in Germany – a cumbersome fact of life for its German competitors, but, obvi-
ously, terra incognita for Wal-Mart Germany’s (mostly) American executives. What is 
more, the company refused to formally acknowledge the outcome of the sector-specific 
centralized wage-bargaining process (which is the standard procedure for determining 
wages in Germany) ver.di, the relevant union, and the retailers’ employers’ association 
had agreed upon. Although it voluntarily paid its staff 0.5 per cent on top of the general 
raise, to the company’s management complete surprise, ver.di retaliated by organizing 
walkouts at 30 stores throughout the country – resulting not only in lost sales but in bad 
publicity for “union-bashing” Wal-Mart.63 As will be discussed in more detail below, 
the ver.di–Wal-Mart controversy is escalating after the union sued the company for 
breaching Germany’s financial information disclosure regulations. 
                                                 
59  See Hirn (2002). 
60  It is being rumored that Wal-Mart Inc., helped by headhunters, is actively seeking a successor for 
him due to Wal-Mart Germany’s continuously unsatisfactory performance (Schlitt 2002, p. 29). 
61  See Wenzel (2002b). 
62  See Bergmann (2000). 
63  See Gehrmann (2001). 
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A final anecdote proves Wal-Mart’s initial hubris with respect to its suppliers: Its minor 
role and lack of buyer’s power on the German market notwithstanding – or simply 
being unaware of it –, the company’s chief executives demanded unlimited access with-
out prior announcement to the factory floors of their suppliers, including most of 
Germany’s best-known and most valuable consumer brands, for on-site quality inspec-
tions. To nobody’s surprise – Wal-Mart’s leaders’ obviously excepted –, however, the 
vast majority of them did not feel the (commercial) need to oblige.64 
 
Neither "everyday low prices" nor "excellent service" 
 
Traditionally, Wal-Mart has inflicted a full-scale price war on incumbents on every 
single market it has so far entered in order to credibly communicate its legendary “every 
day low price”-pledge to local consumers. While extremely successful almost every-
where else, this strategy badly backfired in Germany – largely due to the afore-mention-
ed ignorance, lack of experience, and hubris of Wal-Mart Germany’s original top man-
agement team led by Rob Tiarks: 
• To his complete surprise, all affected German competitors, first and foremost 
Aldi – which throughout its existence successfully defended its position as Ger-
many’s undisputed cost and price leader –, Lidl, Rewe and Edeka, not only 
matched all of Wal-Mart’s price cuts.65 Even worse, the results of several inde-
pendent surveys, commissioned by newspapers or conducted by Stiftung Waren-
test, a highly influential government-sponsored consumer protection agency, and 
the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK), Germany’s biggest market-re-
search institute, demystified Wal-Mart’s fundamental value proposition “every-
day low prices” as a (largely) empty promise: They showed that Wal-Mart had 
not been able to systematically undercut Aldi and the other hard discounters, and 
that, by contrast, its assortment was not even substantially cheaper then the tra-
ditional retailers’ (Rewe, Edeka etc.) offerings.66  
• So far Wal-Mart Germany has not succeeded in delivering on the second part of 
its value proposition  – “excellent customer service” – either. By contrast the 
company has repeatedly been rated as only just or even slightly below average in 
terms of overall consumer satisfaction (Table 7).67 In our view, this is because 
Wal-Mart’s traditional US-centered view of customer service, enshrined in some 
of its famous/notorious basic beliefs and rules, is only partly compatible with the 
expectations of German consumers. This is in particular true of the famous “ten-
foot-rule” (“three-meter-rule” in metric Germany) and the institution of the 
“greeter” (which, in the meantime, have been largely abolished after shoppers 
unaware of its key role in Wal-Mart’s service concept had repeatedly complain-
ed that they had been harassed by strangers on store premises). While yielding 
                                                 
64  See Bergmann (2000). 
65  See Manager Magazin (1999b: 42). 
66  See Lebensmittelzeitung Internet edition (2002b). 
67  For a more recent survey – with an equally disillusioning outcome for Wal-Mart – see Wirt-
schaftswoche (2002). 
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little tangible economic benefits – German consumers have been accustomed for 
decades to shopping at self-service formats without any staff assistance –, the 
additional personnel required to perform these services efficiently, are the cause 
why Wal-Mart’s labor costs (as a percentage of total costs) continue to remain 
above the industry’s average.  
• Finally, suffice it to say that Germany’s restrictive shopping hour regulations 
prevent Wal-Mart (as well as any other Germany-based retailer, to be sure) from 
offering its customers the additional convenience and superior shopping comfort 
associated with 24/7 operations. 
 
 
Table 7: German Retailers: Overall Customer Satisfaction 
Rank Company 
 
Satisfaction Index 
(Maximum: 100) 
1 Aldi Group 73.45 
2 Globus 71.42 
3 Kaufland 71.01 
4 Lidl 69.09 
5 Norma 68.52 
6 Marktkauf 66.96 
7 Wal-Mart 64.39 
8 Metro 63.97 
9 Penny 63.32 
10 Real 62.50 
Source: KPMG/EHI (2001, p.15) 
 
 
Repeated Infringements of German Laws and Regulations 
 
With the ensuing negative publicity, Wal-Mart stands accused of, or has already been 
tried and fined for breaching several important German laws and regulations, in parti-
cular 
• Section 20(4) of the ”Act Against Restraints of Competition“ (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen or GWB). This centerpiece of German antitrust le-
gislation bans all ”undertakings with superior market power“68 from selling a 
range of goods ”not merely occasionally below its cost price, unless there is an 
objective justification for this“, 
• Section 335a of the ”Commercial Act“ (Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB). It requires 
all corporations to disclose basic financial information including a balance sheet 
and an annual profit or loss statement and,  
                                                 
68  Based upon section 19 of the act both the German Federal Cartel Office and the courts defined 
Wal-Mart Germany as an undertaking with superior market power – despite its tiny share of the 
German retail market but because of the huge financial resources of Wal-Mart Inc. 
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• in early January 2003, the recently amended ”Obligatory Deposit Regulation“. It 
stipulates that retailers must provide a deposit-refund-system for certain types of 
plastic and metal beverage containers or, alternatively, to refrain from selling 
any product bottled or canned in containers which are covered by this piece of 
legislation. 
 
Wal-Mart’s failure to comply with the provisions of the German antitrust act may 
simply be considered a further proof of its initial hubris with regard to the workings and 
intricacies of the German retail market.69 Its unwillingness to publish key financial data 
– despite increasingly hefty fines levied against the company, and more recently, also 
against Dave Ferguson, head of Wal-Mart’s European operations, Kay Hafner (CEO 
Germany), and Gottfried Haug (CFO Germany) personally – is now widely perceived 
by analysts and the media as a blunt attempt to prevent outsiders – including share-
holders – from taking a true and fair view of the dire state of Wal-Mart‘s German busi-
ness activities.70,71 
  
Conclusion and Outlook 
 
Wal-Mart’s difficulties on the highly competitive German market can, after five years 
of extremely disappointing results, no longer be discarded as mere teething problems. 
Widely perceived now as a mediocre retailer with no particular strengths and weak-
nesses, let alone any particularly attractive and credible value proposition, Wal-Mart 
Germany seems light-years away from meeting the internal financial benchmarks set by 
Wal-Mart Inc.’s Bentonville headquarters: a return on equity of 17 per cent (10 per cent 
after tax) and the requirement that any investment must have been completely refi-
nanced by means of the cash flow it generates after a maximum period of 15 years. As 
we have tried to demonstrate, Wal-Mart’s failure on the German market has been the in-
evitable result of its inability – caused by an astounding degree of ignorance of key 
principles of internationalization strategies and intercultural management – to select and 
implement an adequate entry and business strategy. Instead of shaking up the extremely 
competitive German retailing sector with an innovative approach to doing business, as it 
has so convincingly done in the USA, in Germany the company seems to be the prey 
rather than the hunter. Wal-Mart Germany’s future looks bleak indeed.  
 
                                                 
69  As for the “Obligatory Deposit Regulation”, almost all retailers reported transition problems. 
70  See Financial Times Deutschland Online Edition (2002); Manager Magazin Online Edition 
(2002). 
71  After suffering a series of defeats before lower courts, in mid-March Wal-Mart Germany took 
the case to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Supreme Court (Ronke/de Paoli 2003). 
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